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NOMINATIVE FAIR USE IN TRADEMARK LAW: REVISITED ONLINE, BUT WAS THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS INVOKED FOR THE LAST TIME? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that you operate an Internet business that refers customers to other Internet 
service companies.  The Internet companies operate by using certain trademarks.  You use some 
of these trademarks in referring to the service companies.  Is your use of the Internet service 
companies’ trademarks on your website permitted under the law?  The simple answer is: Yes.  
However, in answering the question above, ancillary questions that arise include (1) whether the 
use of another’s mark on an e-commerce website for reference purposes constitutes trademark 
infringement, (2) whether the use on the accused infringer’s website was in visible Internet 
content, invisible content, or the domain name, (3) whether a statutory trademark defense, such 
as fair use, permits such use, (4) whether a court recognizes any other defenses, such as 
nominative fair use, which permit such use, and (5) if nominative fair use is recognized, which 
test is the appropriate test of fairness?  These considerations will be addressed against the 
backdrop of trademark with the Third Circuit’s recently articulated nominative fair use analysis 
drawing the curtain over the Ninth Circuit’s traditional nominative fair use analysis.  Ultimately, 
the answers to these questions will shape the scope of use permitted to one Internet business 
using other companies’ marks.   
Further,  
II. DISCUSSION 
A. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
The lodestar of any trademark infringement analysis is the likelihood of 
confusion.1 As the Lanham Act suggests, there are at least two species of confusion: 
confusion as to origin2 or confusion as to sponsorship.3 To determine whether there is 
indeed a likelihood of confusion, courts have generally applied an eight factor balancing 
test.  Factors will typically include: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) similarity between 
the two marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner 
will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) good faith; (7) the quality of the defendant’s 
product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.4
In addressing trademark infringement on the Internet, courts continue to apply a 
likelihood of confusion test,5 but have introduced different considerations in three general 
areas: the domain name,6 visible Internet content,7 and invisible Internet content.8
Brookfield, the seminal Ninth Circuit case, addressed trademark infringement on the 
Internet via both the domain name and invisible content, in the metatags, of websites.  
Brookfield, an information provider, sought to enjoin a video rental store chain from 
using its “MovieBuff” trademark in the chain’s website’s domain name, 
“moviebuff.com,” and metatags.9 The court applied the Sleekcraft likelihood of 
confusion test and concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success 
on its claim that the defendant’s use in its domain name of a mark confusingly similar to 
plaintiff’s mark violated the Lanham Act.10 The court then turned its attention to 
plaintiff’s claims in the “metatag context,” which it found to be different from the domain 
name context.11 Eschewing the traditional test, the court noted that “the traditional 
[Sleekcraft] test is not well-suited for analyzing the metatags issue” and instead adopted 
the use of “initial interest confusion”12 as a basis on which to find likelihood of confusion 
in the special context of metatags.13 
NOMINATIVE FAIR USE IN TRADEMARK LAW: REVISITED ONLINE, BUT WAS THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS INVOKED FOR THE LAST TIME? 
Page 2 of 8 
B. AFFIRMATIVE TRADEMARK DEFENSE: CLASSIC FAIR USE 
Recognizing that “a trademark is a limited property right in a particular word, phrase or 
symbol,”14 section 33 of the Lanham Act15 sets forth fair use defenses under which one’s use of 
another’s mark may be permissible.  “[T]rademark law recognizes a defense where the mark is 
used only to describe the goods or services of a party, or their geographic origin.16 Just as 
trademark law forbids others from misappropriating a mark holder’s mark as his own,17 fair use 
forbids a mark holder from misappropriating a descriptive term from others for his exclusive 
use.18 This reasoning is no different in cyberspace; in the Internet context, fair use doctrine 
applies with as much force “as it does in the real world.”19 
C. NOMINATIVE FAIR USE 
1. THE NEW KIDS TEST 
Believing the traditional likelihood of confusion test to be inappropriate for nominative 
fair use analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block v. News 
America Pub., Inc.20 struck a new path in fair use analysis by distinguishing classic fair use or 
nominative fair use.21 The Ninth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff’s rights in its 
trademarked name outweighed the rights of others to use it in identifying the plaintiff’s mark as 
the subject of public opinion polls.22 Accordingly, the court held that “where the defendant uses 
a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s product, rather than its own, . . . a commercial user is 
entitled to a nominative fair use defense . . ..”23 
Indeed, there may be situations where others have no alternative but to use the producer’s 
mark.24 Where this is the case, the use of the producer’s mark may be allowed if the mark is 
“used only to describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.”25 Put more generally, cases 
in which the nominative fair use defense may apply are situations “where the use of the 
trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of 
one product for a different one.”26 To distinguish nominative fair use from classic fair use, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that: 
“[i]f the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark refers to something other than 
the plaintiff’s product, the traditional fair use inquiry will continue to govern.  
But, where the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s product, 
rather than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair 
use defense . . ..”27 
Therefore, for the use to be considered a nominative fair use, the accused infringer must 
demonstrate that:  
“(1) the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without 
use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is 
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) the user must do 
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.”28 
Following the New Kids case, its progeny have further illuminated the rationale behind 
nominative fair use doctrine.  In Playboy Enters. v. Welles,29 the Ninth Circuit explained why the 
three-factor test enunciated in New Kids “better evaluates in nominative use cases.”30 The Ninth 
Circuit stated that “[w]hen a defendant uses a trademark nominally, the trademark will be 
identical to the plaintiff’s mark, at least in terms of the words in question.”31 Accordingly, 
application of the traditional likelihood of confusion test32 would errantly and automatically lead 
to the conclusion that “virtually all nominative uses are confusing.”33 In the same year that 
Welles was decided, the Ninth Circuit decided Cairns where it refined the nominative and class 
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fair use distinction.34 “The nominative fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has 
used the plaintiff’s mark to describe the plaintiff’s product, even if the defendant’s ultimate goal 
is to describe his own product.”35 Thus, Cairns expanded the class of cases under which 
nominative fair use may fall.  “Conversely, the classic fair use analysis is appropriate where a 
defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark only to describe his own product, and not at all to 
describe the plaintiff’s product.”36 A year later, the Ninth Circuit, in Brother Records v. 
Jardine,37 further explained the nominative and classic fair use distinction.38 Classic fair use 
applies when the accused infringer uses the mark in its primary, descriptive sense; alternatively, 
nominative fair use applies when the accused infringer uses the mark in its secondary, trademark 
sense.39 
2. CENTURY 21 REAL ESTATE CORP. V. LENDINGTREE, INC. 
Like many other Federal Courts of Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
had never encountered the nominative fair use issue prior to Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. 
Lendingtree, Inc.40 In Century 21,41 the Third Circuit considered the proper test to apply where a 
defendant asserts a nominative fair use defense to a claim of trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act.42 
Century 21, ERA and Coldwell Banker oversaw a system of franchisees that operated by 
reference to the franchisor’s trademark.43 Franchise agreements permitted those brokerage 
companies to provide realty services under trademarks held by Cendant Corporation.44 Every 
franchisee was granted a license to use its franchisor’s trademark only in connection with its 
“d/b/a” name.45 LendingTree (“LT”) was an Internet business that helped consumers identify 
and select qualified lenders, real estate brokers, auto insurers, and other financial service 
companies.46 It had a real estate referral service that consumers can access by visiting its website 
and inputting the location and characteristics of the house they are seeking to buy or sell.47 LT 
selected and transmitted information about up to four real estate companies participating in LT’s 
referral network that service that community.48 
The issue presented to the district court was the use of Cendant Corporation’s marks on 
LT’s webpage.49 The district court determined that LT’s use of Cendant Corporation’s names 
was likely to cause consumer confusion, that the nominative use defense did not shield LT in this 
instance, and thus, granted CCE’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to the use of some of 
Cendant Corporation’s marks.50 Subsequently, LT appealed the issuance of the preliminary 
injunction.51 
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use analysis.52 In departing from the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal’s nominative fair use analysis, the Third Circuit first reasoned that 
classic and nominative fair use were not so different as to call for a different approach.53 The 
Third Circuit next reasoned that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s approach would unfairly 
benefit the plaintiff in not requiring likelihood of confusion as a predicate to the defendant’s 
assertion or demonstration of nominative fair use.54 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that 
under the circumstances of the case, the proper analysis involves a bifurcated inquiry.55 First, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the likelihood of confusion in defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark.56 
Second, only upon plaintiff meetings its burden, the defendant must demonstrate that its 
nominative use of plaintiff’s mark is nonetheless fair.57 To demonstrate fairness, the accused 
infringer must show three elements:  
“(1) that the use of plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff’s 
product or service and the defendant’s product or service; (2) that the defendant 
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uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s 
product; and (3) that the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and 
accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.”58 
3. CLASSIC AND NOMINATIVE FAIR USE IN OTHER CIRCUIT 
COURTS 
The Ninth Circuit understandably remains the most fluent in nominative fair use 
doctrine.59 Indeed, only the Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits have acknowledged the nominative 
fair use defense.60 The Sixth Circuit has definitively rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach.  In 
PACAAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C.,61 the Sixth Circuit stated that “[t]his circuit has 
never followed the nominative fair use analysis, always having applied the Frisch’s Restaurants 
test. We are not inclined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s analysis here.”62 The Fifth Circuit has only 
partially adopted the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use analysis.63 In Pebble Beach, the Fifth 
Circuit only required of the defendant asserting a nominative fair use to demonstrate (1) only so 
much of the mark as necessary to identify the product or service was used and (2) the absence of 
suggestion of affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement.64 The Second Circuit eminently 
illustrates the difficulties in nominative fair use.  In Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,65 the Second 
Circuit noted that the district court had applied the standard for nominative fair use as articulated 
by the Ninth Circuit, but found that the lower court had erred in its application.66 Despite the 
ostensible approval of the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use analysis, the Second Circuit, in 
Courtenay Communs. Corp. v. Hall,67 cited in a footnote to the Fifth Circuit’s Pebble Beach test 
rather than to the Ninth Circuit’s New Kids test.68 
4. NOMINATIVE FAIR USE: THE PROPER TEST 
i. CLASSIC AND NOMINATIVE FAIR USE SHOULD NOT 
REQUIRE DIFFERENT ANALYSES 
When an accused infringer asserts a nominative fair use defense, first, the court should 
first determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of confusion and second, 
determine whether the use is fair.  In Century 21, the Third Circuit justified its rejection of the 
New Kids test on two grounds.  In addition to recognizing that classic and nominative fair uses 
are indeed different, the Third Circuit also recognized that both classic and nominative fair use 
analyses shared a significantly common component.69 In either classic or nominative fair use 
cases, the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark in a way that confuses consumers.  In the classic 
case, the consumer is confused as to whether the defendant’s products are the same as the 
plaintiff’s products.  However, in the nominative case, the consumer is confused as to whether 
the plaintiff sponsors or endorses defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark. 
Indeed, several years following Cairns, the Ninth Circuit, in Brother Records, Inc. 
v. Jardine,70 added another wrinkle to classic and nominative fair use distinction.  The 
Ninth Circuit noted that, sometimes, the defendant’s title may simultaneously be the 
plaintiff’s mark.71 The Court admitted that in a case like this, the Ninth Circuit’s 
nominative and classic fair use distinction may be problematic.72 Further, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that: “[w]here the defendant uses his or her own title, which happens to be 
plaintiff’s trademark, defendant can argue convincingly both that the use refers to 
defendant and that the use refers not at to defendant.”73 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
tacitly acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the target of description 
distinction74 may not be as robust a distinction to justify jettisoning the likelihood of 
confusion test. 
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ii. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IS ESSENTIAL TO TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS 
The Third Circuit also justified its conclusion on the ground that likelihood of confusion 
should remain a principal component of the nominative fair use analysis.  The Third Circuit 
explained that the Ninth Circuit’s approach would place the initial burden on the defendant 
without ever requiring of the plaintiff to prove one of the “key elements of a trademark 
infringement case.”75 The court pointed to the statute76 itself as well as the Supreme Court’s 
decision in KP Permanent Make--Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 120 
(2004).77 The Third Circuit reasoned that the language of the Lanham Act compels the 
conclusion that likelihood of confusion is essential to determining whether trademark 
infringement has occurred.78 The Lanham Act forbids use of words or marks in a way which is 
likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services.79 
Accordingly, the Third Circuit opted not “to read this requirement out of a case alleging 
trademark infringement.”80 
In KP Permanent Make-Up, the Supreme Court held that: “A party raising the statutory 
affirmative defense to a claim of trademark infringement does not have a burden to negate any 
likelihood that the practice complained of will confuse consumers about the origin of the goods 
or services affected.”81 The Supreme Court rejected the notion that, in the context of classic fair 
use, the party asserting the fair use defense to a claim of trademark infringement had any burden 
to negate the likelihood that the practice complained of will confuse consumers about the origin 
of the services or goods affected.82 In explaining that “the burden of proving likelihood of 
confusion rests with the plaintiff[] and the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to show 
confusion unlikely,” the Supreme Court held that “some possibility of consumer confusion must 
be compatible with fair use.”83 
D. ANALYSIS 
On balance of the foregoing principles and discussion, a website may use another’s mark 
to describe the trademark holder’s product or services.  However, permission requires that the 
website using another’s trademark limit its use within the rubric of non-confusing, fair use.  In 
other words, an accused infringer’s use may be permitted if (1) there is no likelihood of 
confusion; or (2) there is a likelihood of confusion, but the use is fair.   
Accordingly, to impose liability upon an accused infringer whose e-commerce 
website references another’s mark, the mark holder must demonstrate that a balancing of 
these factors would lead to a likelihood of confusion as to origin or sponsorship.  Even in 
the Internet context, the likelihood of confusion remains of paramount concern in 
trademark infringement analysis.  In the internet context, one court has noted, the three 
most important of these factors are: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the relatedness of 
the goods or services; and (3) the “simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing 
channel.”84 
Indeed, in the Internet context, use of a trademark in invisible content, like 
metatags, visible content, like HTML code, or the domain name may trigger different 
considerations to accurately evaluate the likelihood of confusion.  Along those lines, the 
use of another’s trademark on web pages, has been found to infringe those trademarks85 
and in other cases has been found non-infringing.86 The use of trademarks in website 
headlines and banner advertisements has been held to be a nominal fair use and, 
therefore, not infringing.87 And the use of another’s trademarks in website wallpaper has 
been held not to be a nominal fair use.88 
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Trademark infringement notwithstanding, the accused infringer’s liability will also 
require weighing the merits of asserted defenses.  To that end, an accused infringer whose e-
commerce website references another’s mark may avoid liability by demonstrating that its use of 
the mark was fair.  However, no consensus exists among the federal courts as to the proper 
approach when an accused infringer asserts a nominative fair use defense.  Specifically, whether 
an accused infringer is permitted to use another’s mark to refer to the mark holder remains 
unsettled law.  Whether the use of another’s trademark constitutes a fair use, classic or 
nominative, and, therefore, non-infringing appears to depend on whether the use is (1) necessary 
to describe the mark holder’s goods or services; (2) only so much as necessary; and (3) not 
misleading.89 
III. CONCLUSION 
While it is lawful for a website to use another’s trademark to reference the trademark 
holder, permission is not absolute.  Because the issue of which trademark infringement analysis 
should be followed when an accused infringer asserts a nominative fair use defense, the scope of 
a website operator’s use of another’s trademark remains nebulous.  Notwithstanding this 
uncertainty, the factors courts use in determining a likelihood of confusion provide at a minimum 
an area of fair use permissible by trademark law.  So long as a website’s use of a trademark 
remains within this ambit of permissibility, its use will remain lawful. 
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